Notarial Public Faith, Rebuttal of Fraud, and Procedural Nullity: An Updated Doctrinal Analysis

Theoretical Framework and Application to Current Law

1. Conceptual Foundations: Public Faith and Legal Proof

This article addresses the issue of public faith, ideological falsehood, and the procedural mechanisms for its impeachment, integrating seven doctrinal articles by renowned jurists. The analysis requires an unavoidable normative update: the original texts cite provisions of the Civil Code of the Nation (Law 340, of 1871) —such as articles 979, 992, 993, and 994— which are now repealed. Consequently, substantive law references have been reformulated to the Civil and Commercial Code of the Nation (CCyC Nación, Decree 79/2014), in force since August 1, 2015. In the procedural realm, the Civil and Commercial Procedural Code of the Province of Buenos Aires (CPCCBA, Law 15,240) applies.

Public faith constitutes a pillar of legal certainty. The law sacrifices, to some extent, the search for absolute truth in favor of certainty and social peace, granting certain officials the power to legally impose belief in the veracity of their narratives. However, this privilege demands extreme rigor in the perception of facts and precisely delimits the suitable procedural paths for its impeachment: the incident of nullity, the rebuttal of fraud, and the motion for reconsideration, depending on the specific object being attacked.

The search for objective legal truth constitutes a guiding principle of the process. As Pedro Bertolino points out, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation has delineated this figure as a standard that rejects the merely formal solution of the case, product of an excessive formal rigor that prevents obtaining essential data, however relevant and evident, for proper judgment. The "truth of the process" can be identified with the judicial proceedings considered as a whole, and the judge cannot consciously renounce its consideration. In Bertolino's words, the "conscious renunciation" to objective legal truth implies "every departure, voluntary and with full knowledge of who does it, from the consideration of procedural data that, appearing patent, are essential, for their relevance and evidence, for the resolution of judicial cases". With manifest ritual excess there is no objective legal truth; without it there is no adequate service of justice.

Key Normative Update: Arts. 979 and 993 of the Vélez Civil Code have been replaced by Arts. 289 and 290 of the CCyC Nación. Art. 290 establishes that a public instrument provides full faith "of the act having been performed and of the facts that the public official declares to have been fulfilled by them or to have passed in their presence." Art. 293 of the Penal Code (ideological falsehood) maintains its validity.

2. Updated Doctrinal Development (Seven Articles)

2.1. Mario Antonio Zinny: "Ideological falsehood, form, and public faith"

Original concept: Zinny establishes a fundamental distinction between form (the act itself) and proof (the document that accredits it). He defines public faith as a "legally imposed belief" referring to the authorship of the instrument and the material existence of the facts perceived by the public official. He emphasizes that public faith only covers the facts that the notary perceives "intersensorially" (sight and hearing), excluding value judgments (such as natural capacity or the notorious identity of a stranger), which do not enjoy public faith and, therefore, cannot constitute ideological falsehood if they turn out to be erroneous.

Normative update: Arts. 979 and 993 of the Vélez Civil Code have been replaced by Arts. 289 and 290 of the CCyC Nación. Zinny's thesis remains fully valid: the public faith of Art. 290 requires that the narrated fact be the object of direct sensory perception. When the public official issues a judgment (e.g., "is a capable person" or "I know their identity" without prior dealing), there is no granting of faith, but an opinion. Erroneous judgments by the notary generate civil or disciplinary liability, but do not constitute ideological falsehood, as they do not violate public faith.

2.2. Adolfo A. Rivas: "The notifying officer's writ as a public instrument and the rebuttal"

Original concept: Rivas analyzes the writ drawn up by the notifying officer, assigning it the character of a public instrument. He argues that, when accused of ideological falsehood in the writ's records (what the official says happened in their presence), the corresponding path is the rebuttal of fraud. He distinguishes between falsehood originating from the parties' statements —that is, the false declarations that private individuals (parties or third parties) make before the public official and that the latter is limited to record without giving faith of their intrinsic veracity (e.g., if the person receiving the notice falsely states the defendant lives there)—, which is attackable by simple contrary proof, and the intellectual or ideological falsehood of the public official (that which falls on the facts that the official says to have perceived personally), which requires dismantling the presumption of full faith through a rigorous evidentiary effort.

Normative update: The character of a public instrument for notification writs is based on Art. 289 inc. b) of the CCyC Nación (public authorities in the exercise of their functions). Full faith is governed by Art. 290 of the CCyC Nación. The notification writ maintains its probatory hierarchy. The presumption of veracity obliges whoever intends to destroy it to assume a specific procedural burden. The rebuttal is not a mere request for suspension of deadlines, but an incidental claim that requires expressly alleging the falsehood, offering compelling proof, and assuming costs and potential criminal liabilities for false reporting.

2.3. Adolfo A. Rivas: "Incompatibility of the rebuttal of fraud incident in procedural acts"

Original concept: Rivas demonstrates that the rebuttal of fraud incident (designed for documentary proof of the substantive legal business) is incompatible with certain procedural acts, such as judicial resolutions or trial proceedings. Applying the rebuttal of fraud to these acts would paralyze the process. On the contrary, the incident of nullity is the suitable path to question the vices of procedural acts, allowing the same purposes as the rebuttal of fraud to be fulfilled without altering the course of the lawsuit.

Dogmatic precision (SCBA jurisprudence and Liberatore's doctrine): However, when what is being attacked is the veracity of what is reported by the Notifying Officer in the notification writ (public faith of perception, Art. 290 CCyC Nación), the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Province of Buenos Aires has been categorical in sustaining that "what is expressed by the Notifying Officer in their report makes full faith and can only be attacked through rebuttal of fraud" (Summary B5056606, CC0000 NE 180 95 (R) I 06/11/2008). Likewise, the doctrine of Gloria L. Liberatore sustains that, although Art. 393 of the CPCCBA is located in the section on documentary evidence, "the norm has general scope, being pertinent for impeaching other public instruments that do not constitute judicial proof in itself", including notification writs.

Normative update and systematization of impugnative paths: The suitable procedural path depends on which aspect of the public instrument is being attacked:

• Rebuttal of fraud (Art. 393 CPCCBA Law 15,240): Proceeds when the veracity of the facts perceived by the Notifying Officer is questioned (public faith of perception, Art. 290 CCyC Nación). Example: if it is alleged that the notifier lied about the copies delivered during the notification act.
• Incident of nullity (Art. 149 CPCCBA Law 15,240): Proceeds when a formal vice of the procedural act is impeached (e.g., lack of copies, Art. 120 CPCCBA), or when other procedural acts such as trial proceedings are attacked.
• Motion for reconsideration (Arts. 238 and 241 CPCCBA Law 15,240): Proceeds against mere procedural step providences based on reports from the judicial secretary (which only have public faith of relation, not of perception).

Confusing these paths leads to defenselessness and arbitrary suspension of deadlines. Attempting a rebuttal of fraud against the judicial secretary's report would be an error of nomen iuris that the court must ex officio re-channel, in application of the ordering and instructing powers provided in Arts. 34 and 36 of the CPCCBA (Law 15,240) and the duty of effective judicial protection.

Legal foundation of the duty of re-channeling (Camps, commentary on Art. 36 CPCCBA): Art. 36 of the CPCCBA grants judges broad ordering and instructing powers, among them: "Order the necessary diligences to clarify the truth of the controverted facts, respecting the right of defense of the parties" (inc. 2º) and "Take measures tending to avoid the paralysis of the process... disposing ex officio the necessary measures" (inc. 1º). As Carlos Enrique Camps points out, today the civil process is conceived more as a means to satisfy with justice the social peace than as a simple combat arena, and the judge can participate actively in it when they understand that the inactivity of some of the parties can frustrate the ultimate end of the jurisdiction. Consequently, the court has the duty to ex officio re-channel the misdirected claim towards the correct procedural path, under warning of incurring in an excess of formal rigor incompatible with the search for objective legal truth.

2.4. Gloria Lucrecia Liberatore: "Nullity of notifications and rebuttal of fraud"

Original concept: Liberatore systematizes the difference between pleading the nullity of a notification for generic vices (via Art. 149 CPCCBA) and rebutting the official's records as false (via Art. 393 CPCCBA). In the latter case, the intervention of the public official as a necessary party is inexcusable, as their faith and professional responsibility are directly compromised, and they must be granted the right to defense and proof.

Normative update: Arts. 290 and 291 of the CCyC Nación. The CPCCBA (Law 15,240) requires, in the processing of the rebuttal of fraud, the summoning of the public official who extended the instrument. The requirement for the public official's intervention in the rebuttal is a constitutional guarantee of defense. The public official is not a mere spectator; they are the holder of the questioned public faith. Their exclusion in the incident vitiates with absolute nullity the resolution declaring the falsehood, as it is dictated without the summoning of the essential party to whom the imputation is directed.

2.5. Ariel E. Provenzani Casares: "The judicial syllogism and backing arguments"

Original concept: Provenzani Casares analyzes the reasoning of judgments through the "judicial syllogism" (Calamandrei). He argues that it is not enough to state the major premise (norm) and the minor premise (fact); the judge must offer "backing arguments" that justify why the norm is applicable and why the facts are subsumed under it. The lack of these arguments constitutes arbitrariness.

Normative update: The duty to provide reasoning is a constitutional guarantee (Arts. 17 and 18 CN; Art. 168 Constitution of PBA). In the evidentiary realm, Art. 375 of the CPCCBA (Law 15,240) establishes the general rule of the burden of proof (whoever alleges a fact must prove it). However, doctrine and jurisprudence have developed the criterion of the dynamic burden of proof, requiring that, in specific cases, the judge must adequately substantiate how they distribute this burden based on which party is in a better position to prove it, without this implying an express legislative modification, but rather a rational application of the principles of equality and due process. A judgment that destroys the public faith of a public instrument based on mere reports from the judicial secretary or statements of parties, without offering "backing arguments" that justify why the presumption of Art. 290 of the CCyC Nación is dismissed, suffers from a lack of reasoning. The judge cannot limit themselves to an apparent syllogism; they must materially justify the destruction of legal proof.

2.6. Functions of the Judicial Secretary and their public faith

Normative foundation (Law 5827, Organic Law of the Judicial Power of the Province of Buenos Aires and Art. 38 CPCCBA Law 15,240): The Judicial Secretary is a lawyer official of superior rank of the Judicial Power who performs judicial and administrative functions. According to Art. 38 of the CPCCBA (Law 15,240), their own functions include: (1) signing simple providences that order the aggregation of documentation and similar proceedings; (2) sending cases to public ministries and other dependencies; (3) returning writings presented out of deadline; (4) giving view of liquidations; (5) subscribing certificates, testimonies, and writs ordered by the judge. Additionally, Art. 125 inc. 5 of the CPCCBA establishes that the Judicial Secretary, for the purposes of hearings, will raise an act of what occurred and was expressed by the parties.

Main functions:

1. Public faith function: To give faith of judicial proceedings and certify copies or testimonies of documents.
2. Authenticating function: To extend acts of hearings and document all procedural proceedings, leaving record of the resolutions dictated by the judges.
3. Custody function: To be responsible for the judicial management archive, where the files and records are kept and guarded.
4. Direction function: To direct in the technical-procedural aspect the personnel integrating the judicial office.

Types of public faith of the Judicial Secretary: Applying Zinny's doctrine and SCBA jurisprudence, the Judicial Secretary holds two types of public faith, according to the nature of the act they extend:

Type of public faith	Function	Example	Impugnative path
Original public faith (of perception)	Gives faith of facts they perceive personally before them	Acts of hearings, acts of lotteries, acts of auctions	Rebuttal of fraud (Art. 393 CPCCBA)
Derived public faith (of relation/collation)	Certifies copies or testimonies of documents they have in sight	Certified copies, file testimonies, reports on what is in the file	Incident of nullity and/or reconsideration (against providence that had it for certain)

Important: Judicial public faith does not correspond to judges or magistrates, since they do not give faith, but rather condemn, acquit, sanction, declare rights, consider certain facts proven, etc. They do not testify about acts of others, but execute acts of their own in the name of the State guarantor of justice.

Note on verification acts: Verification acts are NOT a function of the Judicial Secretary, but of the Notifying Officers delegated by the Office of Mandates and Notifications (Ruling 3397/08 SCBA). Therefore, they do not correspond to the public faith of the Judicial Secretary.

Cases where rebuttal of fraud proceeds against the Judicial Secretary: When the Judicial Secretary acts as a public official giving faith of facts they perceive personally (hearings, lotteries, auctions), their act is a public instrument with public faith of perception. In those cases, the suitable path to impeach the veracity of the perceived facts is the rebuttal of fraud (Art. 393 CPCCBA).

Concrete examples:

• Act of hearing: The Judicial Secretary gives faith that "the witness Juan Pérez declared that he saw the defendant at the place of the fact." If it is questioned that this declaration really existed, the rebuttal of fraud proceeds.
• Act of lottery: The Judicial Secretary gives faith that "the expert Juan García was lottery-selected." If it is questioned that the lottery was really held or that the result was different, the rebuttal of fraud proceeds.
• Act of auction: The Judicial Secretary gives faith that "the bidder Juan Pérez offered $1,000,000 for the auctioned good." If it is questioned that this bid really existed, the rebuttal of fraud proceeds.

Distinction between material and ideological falsehood: Applying Arts. 292 and 293 of the Penal Code, it must be distinguished:

• Material falsehood (Art. 292 CP): Consists in creating a false document or altering a true one. Example: if someone takes a true act and physically changes the words, we are before material falsehood.
• Ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP): Consists in inserting false statements in a true document. This criminal type could be configured if a public official, in the exercise of their functions, inserted false statements in a public instrument concerning a fact that the document must prove, in such a way that it may result in harm, and always provided that direct intent is proven (effective knowledge of the falsehood and will to insert it).

Principle of displacement: According to criminal doctrine, "material falsehood displaces ideological falsehood." This means that if there is material falsehood (apocryphal signature), there cannot be simultaneously ideological falsehood. Ideological falsehood only configures when the document is formally authentic.

Objective liability of the Judicial Secretary and delimitation of functions: Following the doctrine of Avalos Blacha and González, the Judicial Secretary is a lawyer official of superior rank who performs judicial and administrative functions, with objective liability founded on the lack of service (Arts. 1764, 1765, and 1766 CCyC Nación, which replace the repealed Art. 1112 of the Civil Code). This liability is objective because it does not require intent or fault of the official, but simply the lack of service or the irregular compliance of their legal obligations.

The functions of the Judicial Secretary are regulated in Art. 38 of the CPCCBA (Law 15,240). Among their own (judicial) functions are: to give faith of judicial proceedings, to raise acts of hearings (Art. 125 inc. 5 CPCCBA), to subscribe certificates and testimonies ordered by the judge, and to subscribe writs.

Important distinction: It must be distinguished between the own (judicial) functions of the Judicial Secretary, which generate public faith (because they are acts of public official in the exercise of their functions), and the administrative functions (preparation of statistical sheets, requests for personnel leave, attendance, data loading by system), which do not generate public faith. As Avalos Blacha and González point out, the large number of administrative functions conferred on the Judicial Secretary often generates an "improper delegation" of the same to other collaborators of the judicial system, blurring the own tasks and generating overlap of functions. However, this delegation does not exempt the Judicial Secretary from their objective liability for the acts that are performed in their office.

2.7. Avalos Blacha and González: "Delimitation of own functions and liability of the Judicial Secretary and Legal Assistant"

Original concept: Avalos Blacha and González analyze the liability of public officials provided in Art. 1112 of the Civil Code (repealed), which established the extracontractual liability of the State, of an objective character, founded on the lack of service. They sustain that judicial secretaries are officials of the Judicial Power to whom jurisdictional tasks have been transferred, requiring in the exercise of said jurisdictional competencies a high-level training.

Normative update: Art. 1112 of the Civil Code has been replaced by Arts. 1764, 1765, and 1766 of the CCyC Nación (Liability of the State), which maintain the principle of objective liability founded on the lack of service. The functions of the Judicial Secretary are regulated in Art. 38 of the CPCCBA (Law 15,240).

Doctrinal contribution: The authors highlight that the large number of administrative functions conferred on the Judicial Secretary (preparation of statistical sheets, requests for personnel leave, attendance, data loading by system) often generates an "improper delegation" of the same to other collaborators of the judicial system, blurring the own tasks of the Judicial Secretary and generating overlap of functions with those of the Legal Assistant. They propose to fix and delimit the own functions of the Judicial Secretary and Legal Assistant, incorporating them through an article to the Statute of the Judicial Agent, to avoid that administrative functions overlap with judicial functions that generate public faith.

3. Practical Cases

PRACTICAL CASE N° 1: Nullity of service of process and Motion for Reconsideration against Judicial Secretary's report

A. Original facts: Contract date: August 28, 2000 (promise of sale). Object of the litigation: compliance with promise, deed execution, and damages. Clause nine: extension of jurisdiction to Courts of Gral. San Martín; special domicile: Junín street, Villa Ballester (buyer). The seller (plaintiff) reported incorrect domicile (Ayacucho street, not contractually agreed). Successive writs returned by the Notifying Officer with the record: "required person did not live there".

B. Action by the buyer (defendant): On December 2, 2008, the defendant promoted an Incident of Nullity of the service of process of the complaint and consecutive acts (Art. 149 CPCCBA Law 15,240). The Judge acknowledged the presentation and granted a 5-day transfer (fs. 73).

C. Development of the notarial conflict: The writ of transfer was issued with copies of 20 useful pages (meticulous detail: incident writ, promise, annex, cease and desist letter, tax bills, ID copies, notarial act, etc.). Notification to plaintiff on December 11, 2008. Return by attorney on December 16, 2008: she claimed that a copy of the incident writ had not been accompanied, only copies of the complaint and documentation. The plaintiff returns her copy of the writ informed by the Notifying Officer, with an indication of the copies detailed in the instrument, along with copies of the complaint writ sealed by the plaintiff.

D. Judicial Secretary's report and problematic judicial decision (December 29, 2008): The Judge, based on a "report from the judicial secretary" that was limited to transcribe the statements of the plaintiff's attorney, resolved to suspend the term to answer the transfer and order to issue a new writ. The Judicial Secretary's report stated: "as arises from the records of the case, with the writ fs. 77/78 copies of the complaint, domain report... have been accompanied" —omitting to refer to the Notifying Officer's report on the executed diligence and copies detailed in the instrument.

E. Critical analysis and correct impugnative path: The Judicial Secretary, when expressing how the procedural act of notification was materially executed (affirming that "copies of the complaint were delivered" and omitting the incident), is exceeding their fiduciary function of "faith of relation" (certifying what is in the file) to issue a "judgment" or "material certification" about a fact they did not witness. Following Zinny, judgments do not produce public faith; only intersensory perceptions (sight and hearing) generate it. The Judicial Secretary has public faith to certify copies (collation) and to testify to the existence of documents in the file (relation), but can never extend to the materiality of the procedural facts they did not witness, because that is the exclusive reserve of the public faith of perception of the Notifying Officer (Art. 290 CCyC Nación).

Suitable impugnative path: The correct approach is the Motion for Reconsideration (Arts. 238 and 241 CPCCBA Law 15,240) with Subsidiary Appeal (Art. 248 CPCCBA Law 15,240), not an autonomous Incident of Nullity. Foundations: (1) The providence ordering a new writ is a mere procedural step providence that does not justify the opening of an autonomous incidental process; (2) The motion for reconsideration directly attacks the Judge's error, forcing them to confront the "certification" of their Judicial Secretary with the Public Instrument (the Notifying Officer's act and the returned writ); (3) If the Judge confirms their providence, they will have unjustifiably denied compliance with their duty to provide reasoning (Art. 272 CPCCBA Law 15,240 / Art. 168 Constitution of PBA), by not offering "backing arguments" (Provenzani Casares) that justify why they displace the Notifying Officer's public faith based on a report from the Judicial Secretary devoid of it.

What happens if it is erroneously attacked via rebuttal of fraud? Following Rivas's doctrine and the principle of procedural economy, the judge has the duty to re-channel the path. According to Arts. 34 and 36 of the CPCCBA (Law 15,240), the judge has ordering and instructing powers to avoid the paralysis of the process and clarify the truth of the controverted facts. If a party files an incident titled "Rebuttal of Fraud" against a report from the judicial secretary about a notification act, but the facts describe a vice in a procedural act, the judge cannot reject it in limine for inadequacy of the path. They must ex officio re-conduct it to an Incident of Nullity, requiring the party to adapt their petition and offer pertinent proof, under warning of considering it withdrawn if they do not do so. Doing otherwise would be falling into a "formalism that leads to retardation", violating due process and the search for objective legal truth.

What happens if the report is not attacked? Does it become "firm" and validate the falsehood? No — that paradox is normative and doctrinally impossible due to the Hierarchy of Public Faith. The writ with the Notifying Officer's act is a Public Instrument (Art. 289 inc. b CCyC Nación) that enjoys full faith over the facts perceived proprios sensibus (Art. 290 CCyC Nación). The report from the Judicial Secretary is a mere "Judgment" or "Faith of Relation". An act of lower hierarchy (a judgment or internal certification) can never acquire "res judicata" or "firmness" that allows it to destroy an act of higher hierarchy (notarial public faith). One cannot "validate" a report that lacks the legal aptitude to displace public faith. If the judge were to leave firm a report from the judicial secretary that contradicts a notarial act, they would not be "validating" the report, but dictating an arbitrary sentence for lack of reasoning (Arts. 17 and 18 CN; Art. 168 Constitution of PBA; Arts. 272, 160 inc. 4 and 5, 161, and 384 CPCCBA).

PRACTICAL CASE N° 2: Ideological falsehood in public deed due to erroneous appraisal of identity

Facts: A notary authorizes a deed of sale. In the act, the notary records the routine formula "appears a capable person and of my knowledge, I give faith". Subsequently, it is discovered that the appearer was impersonating the true owner using an altered ID. The buyer criminally sues the notary for ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP).

Legal problem: Does the notary's affirmation of "knowing" the grantor constitute ideological falsehood when in reality they only limited themselves to verifying their ID without having prior dealings with them?

Substantiated solution (Zinny): It does not constitute ideological falsehood. Public faith (Art. 290 CCyC Nación) only covers the facts that the notary perceives sensorially. The affirmation "is of my knowledge" when the notary does not have prior dealings with the grantor is not the narration of a perceived fact, but a judgment ("it seems to me that they are who they say they are according to the exhibited document"). The notary's judgments do not produce public faith. Therefore, there is no violated public faith, an indispensable requirement for Art. 293 of the Penal Code. The notary could respond civilly or disciplinarily for their imprudence, but not criminally for ideological falsehood.

PRACTICAL CASE N° 3: Material falsehood by judicial employee who subscribes document with Judicial Secretary's seal

Facts (variants):

• Variant A: In a court, a judicial employee (administrative assistant, without character of public official with public faith) drafts a report on what is in a file. Instead of elevating the project to the Judicial Secretary for them to subscribe it, the employee takes the Judicial Secretary's seal and signs the report in their name. The report contains false statements about the documents that were accompanied with a notification writ.
• Variant B: The Judicial Secretary drafts the report, but due to excessive work, delegates to an employee the signature of the same with their seal.
• Variant C: The Judicial Secretary drafts the report and signs it personally, but the document contains false statements about the facts that should be proven (e.g., affirming that copies of the complaint were accompanied when in reality the incident of nullity was accompanied).

Legal problem: Are we before material falsehood (Art. 292 CP) or ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP)? What differences are there between these three variants? What impugnative paths proceed?

Substantiated solution:

Variant A (wholly false document): We are before material falsehood (Art. 292 CP), because the employee is creating a false document making it appear as emanated from the Judicial Secretary, when in reality it was drafted and subscribed by them. It is not ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP), because the document is not authentic: the Judicial Secretary did not subscribe it nor authorized its subscription. Material falsehood displaces ideological falsehood. From the perspective of Bunge, this conduct is conceptually possible both in the procedural and criminal planes, because it does not introduce an insurmountable logical contradiction, but rather a violation of the legal order. In the procedural plane, the act is invalid (null for lack of competence of the official, Art. 149 CPCCBA, Law 15,240), but not conceptually impossible: invalidity is precisely the legal consequence provided by the system for an act that, in fact, can occur. In the criminal plane, the conduct is typically subsumable under the crimes of material falsehood (Art. 292 CP) or ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP), depending on the case, which confirms its full conceptual possibility within the normative system. In both planes, it is a real possibility (it can occur in practice).

Variant B (document drafted by Judicial Secretary but signed by employee): We are before material falsehood (Art. 292 CP) for apocryphal signature. Although the content was drafted by the Judicial Secretary (and may be true), the signature does not correspond to the competent official. Material falsehood (apocryphal signature) displaces ideological falsehood. From Bunge's perspective, this assumption is also conceptually possible in both the procedural and criminal planes, for the same reasons as Variant A. In both planes, it is a real possibility.

Variant C (document with false content but authentic signature): If the Judicial Secretary personally signs the report but it contains false statements about facts, in the criminal plane we could be before ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP), because the document is formally authentic (true signature) but contains false statements. However, criminal doctrine requires direct intent (effective knowledge of the falsehood and will to insert it); simple error or negligence without dolous agreement generates civil or disciplinary liability, but does not configure the criminal type. Important clarification: Although the conduct could configure the crime of ideological falsehood in the criminal plane, the suitable procedural path to impeach the report in the civil process is NOT the rebuttal of fraud (Art. 393 CPCCBA), because this incident only proceeds against public instruments with public faith of perception, and the judicial secretary's report only has public faith of relation. The suitable path is the incident of nullity (Art. 149 CPCCBA) against the report, or the motion for reconsideration (Arts. 238 and 241 CPCCBA) against the providence based on it. Both planes —criminal and procedural— are autonomous and do not exclude each other.

Impugnative paths:

• Incident of nullity (Art. 149 CPCCBA): To impeach the act for lack of competence of the employee (who is not a public official with public faith).
• Motion for reconsideration (Arts. 238 and 241 CPCCBA): If the report was the basis of a judicial providence, against the providence.
• Criminal complaint (Art. 292 CP): For material falsehood of public document (in variants A and B).
• Incident of nullity (Art. 149 CPCCBA) or Motion for reconsideration (Arts. 238 and 241 CPCCBA): Against the judicial secretary's report, even if it contains false statements, the suitable procedural path is NOT the rebuttal of fraud, because the report only has public faith of relation, not of perception. The suitable path is the incident of nullity against the report, or the motion for reconsideration against the judicial providence based on it. Independently, if direct intent is proven, the conduct could configure the crime of ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP) in the criminal plane.

Consequences for public faith: In variants A and B, the report does not enjoy public faith, because the competence of the official who subscribes it is lacking. Therefore, it does not enjoy the presumption of veracity that public faith grants, and it can be disregarded without the need to promote an incident of rebuttal of fraud.

Objective liability of the Judicial Secretary (Avalos Blacha and González): Following the doctrine of Avalos Blacha and González, the Judicial Secretary is objectively liable for the acts that are performed in their office, even if they are performed by employees under their charge without authorization. This objective liability (Arts. 1764, 1765, and 1766 of the CCyC Nación) is founded on the lack of service, and does not require intent or fault of the official. Therefore, although the employee has acted without authorization, the Judicial Secretary is objectively liable for the lack of control over the acts that are performed in their office. This liability reinforces the idea that the Judicial Secretary must rigorously control the acts that are performed in their office, and that the "improper delegation" of tasks does not exempt them from their liability.

PRACTICAL CASE N° 4: Deficient reasoning of the judicial syllogism and lack of backing arguments

Facts: In a lawsuit for damages, the plaintiff presents an extrajudicial transaction signed with the insurer. The plaintiff argues that the transaction is null due to the vice of subjective-objective lesion (Art. 332 CCyC Nación), arguing that they were in a state of physical and economic need after the accident. The judge of first instance rejects the claim with the following reasoning: "The transaction is a valid contract that extinguishes obligations (Art. 1641 CCyC Nación). The plaintiff signed freely. The invoked nullity is rejected."

Legal problem: Does a sentence that states the major premise (validity of the transaction) but omits the "backing arguments" to justify why the alleged vice of lesion is not configured comply with the duty to provide reasoning?

Substantiated solution (Provenzani Casares): The sentence is arbitrary and must be revoked. The judge cannot limit themselves to an apparent syllogism. They must offer "backing arguments" that justify the minor premise (the concrete case). The judge should have analyzed whether there was exploitation of need (subjective aspect) and patrimonial disproportion (objective aspect) in accordance with Art. 332 of the CCyC Nación. By omitting to weigh the facts alleged by the plaintiff and limiting themselves to the mere enunciation of the generic validity of the transaction, the sentence lacks external justification, depriving the plaintiff of their right to defense and oversight (Art. 168 Constitution of PBA; Art. 272 CPCCBA Law 15,240). It corresponds to annul the sentence and dictate a new one that analyzes in detail the concurrence or not of the vice of lesion.

PRACTICAL CASE N° 5: False statements of a witness recorded in an act of hearing

Facts: In an evidentiary hearing, a witness declares facts that the opposing party considers false. The Judicial Secretary of the court raises the act of the hearing (Art. 125 inc. 5, CPCCBA Law 15,240) and faithfully transcribes that "the witness Juan Pérez declared that he saw the defendant at the place of the fact". Subsequently, the opposing party presents evidence (videos, other witnesses) that demonstrate that what the witness said is objectively false.

Legal problem: What corresponds to do before the false statements of a witness recorded in an act of hearing? Does the rebuttal of fraud proceed against the act subscribed by the Judicial Secretary?

Substantiated solution: The rebuttal of fraud does NOT proceed against the act, because the Judicial Secretary is not giving faith of the veracity of what was declared by the witness, but only of the fact that the witness declared what is recorded in the act (public faith of perception about the act of declaring, not about the content of the declaration). The rebuttal of fraud (Art. 393 CPCCBA, Law 15,240) would only proceed if it were questioned that the witness did NOT say what the act says they said (that is, if the fidelity of the Judicial Secretary's transcription were attacked, not the truth of what was said by the witness).

To unmask the witness's lie, the evidentiary and valuation tools that the procedural code itself provides must be used, in coherence with the doctrine of Zinny and Rivas, and with the system of valuation of testimonial proof of the CPCCBA:

• In the stage of production of the proof:
  • Interrogate the witness to evidence contradictions (Art. 440 CPCCBA, Law 15,240).
  • Formulate opposition or observations to the suitability of the witness (Arts. 426 and 456 CPCCBA, Law 15,240), if appropriate.
  • Request confrontations if there are contradictions between witnesses or between them and the parties (Art. 446 CPCCBA, Law 15,240).
  • If the declarations offered serious indications of false testimony, request the judge to proceed in accordance with Art. 447 CPCCBA (detention and remission of the presumed guilty to the competent criminal judge).
• In the stage of allegations and sentence:
  • Argue in the allegations the lack of credibility of the witness, pointing out contradictions, lack of peripheral corroboration, interest in the result of the lawsuit, etc.
  • Request the judge that, in the sentence, they value the testimony in accordance with the rules of sound criticism (Art. 384 CPCCBA, Law 15,240) and deny it probatory efficacy.
• In the sentence itself (if the judge incorrectly values the testimony):
  • If the judge grants full faith to an objectively false or implausible testimony without exposing the reasons, the sentence can be attacked for arbitrariness in the valuation of the proof (Art. 384 CPCCBA; Art. 168 Constitution of PBA), through appeal.

Conclusion: Public faith is a shield for legal certainty, but it does not shield the witness's lie. The Judicial Secretary's act enjoys full faith regarding what was said in the hearing, but the veracity of what was said is subject to sound criticism and the rules of probatory valuation that the procedural code itself provides. Additionally, the procedural order offers a specific tool before false testimony: the detention and criminal remission of the witness (Art. 447 CPCCBA), which is the most forceful way to sanction the lie in hearing.

PRACTICAL CASE N° 6: Rebuttal of fraud against act of lottery of experts

Facts: In a lottery of experts, the Judicial Secretary of the court gives faith of the result of the lottery. In the act of lottery, the Judicial Secretary records: "The expert Juan García was lottery-selected, from the list of official experts". Subsequently, one of the parties presents evidence (video recording of the lottery) that demonstrate that in reality the expert María López was lottery-selected, not Juan García.

Legal problem: Does the rebuttal of fraud proceed against the act of lottery? What impugnative paths proceed?

Substantiated solution: The rebuttal of fraud (Art. 393 CPCCBA) proceeds, because the Judicial Secretary, when subscribing the act of lottery, is acting as a public official with public faith of perception (original public faith), giving faith of facts they perceive personally before them (the result of the lottery). If the veracity of what the Judicial Secretary declares to have perceived personally (the result of the lottery) is questioned, the suitable path is the rebuttal of fraud.

Consequences: If it is demonstrated that the result of the lottery was different, the act can be declared false through rebuttal of fraud. Additionally, the Judicial Secretary could incur criminal liability for ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP), if it is demonstrated that they inserted false statements in the act knowing they were false (direct intent). The lottery must be repeated, and the expert proofs performed by the incorrectly lottery-selected expert must be declared null.

4. Implications: The Role of the Judicial Secretary and Impugnative Paths

The preceding analysis allows us to systematize the dogmatic and procedural implications of the distinction between the types of public faith and the correct impugnative paths:

1 Hierarchy of Public Faith: The Judicial Secretary is a public official (Art. 289 inc. a CCyC Nación) and enjoys public faith, but limited to three categories: (a) Public faith of collation ("I CERTIFY that the photocopy is a faithful reproduction of the original"); (b) Public faith of relation ("As appears in the records, at fs. X there is a document"); (c) Insurmountable limit: judgments. When the Judicial Secretary states "it arises from the records of the case that with the writ copies of the complaint have been accompanied" (omitting the notifier's report and documentation detailed in the instrument), they are NOT exercising public faith, but issuing a JUDGMENT that contradicts the public instrument they say they are analyzing.

2 Distinction of impugnative paths according to the attacked object: The suitable procedural path depends on which aspect of the public instrument is being attacked: (a) If the veracity of the facts perceived by the Notifying Officer is questioned (public faith of perception, Art. 290 CCyC Nación), the incident of rebuttal of fraud corresponds (Art. 393 CPCCBA Law 15,240), in accordance with SCBA jurisprudence (Summary B5056606) and Liberatore's doctrine. (b) If a formal vice of the procedural act is impeached (e.g., lack of copies), the incident of nullity corresponds (Arts. 149, 172, and 178 CPCCBA Law 15,240). (c) If the report of the judicial secretary is impeached (which only has public faith of relation, not of perception), the Motion for Reconsideration (Arts. 238 and 241 CPCCBA) against the providence that had it for valid or the Incident of Nullity against the report corresponds. Attempting a rebuttal of fraud against the judicial secretary's report would be an error of nomen iuris that the court must ex officio re-channel, in application of Arts. 34 and 36 of the CPCCBA Law 15,240 and the duty of effective judicial protection.

3 The conduct of the Judicial Secretary: between ideological falsehood and procedural disloyalty: Following Zinny, the Judicial Secretary does not commit material falsehood (Art. 292 CP) because they do not physically alter the notifier's act. However, when they issue their own report with false statements about facts that must be proven, they could incur in ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP), insofar as they are a public official who inserts false statements in a public instrument (the judicial secretary's report is a public instrument with public faith of relation, Art. 289 inc. b CCyC Nación). Important distinction: Although the judicial secretary's report could configure the crime of ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP), the suitable procedural path to impeach it is NOT the rebuttal of fraud (Art. 393 CPCCBA), because this incident only proceeds against public instruments with public faith of perception. Against the judicial secretary's report, the suitable path is the incident of nullity (Art. 149 CPCCBA). However, criminal doctrine requires direct intent (effective knowledge of the falsehood and will to insert it); simple error or negligence without dolous agreement generates civil or disciplinary liability, but does not configure the criminal type. Additionally, they incur in a grave procedural disloyalty by issuing an administrative certification that contradicts a public instrument with public faith of perception, inducing the Judge into error.

4 The returned writ as compelling proof: When the plaintiff returns their copy of the writ where the Notifier detailed the delivered pages (including the incident), they are tacitly confessing that they had in their power the instrument that detailed the delivery. The confrontation between the Notifier's act (which enjoys full faith, Art. 290 CCyC Nación) and the writ returned by the plaintiff (which corroborates the act) demonstrates that the Judicial Secretary's judgment is materially erroneous or malicious. There is no need to rebut anything: it is destroyed with simple contrary proof.

5 Objective liability of the notification office: Ruling 3397/08 of the SCBA ("Regulation on the Regime of File Receptions, Archives of the Judicial Power, and Mandates and Notifications") establishes the objective liability of the Heads of Offices over the fidelity and accuracy of documents and information supplied. This regulation reinforces the presumption of veracity of the Notifying Officer's writ and limits the aptitude of the judicial secretary's reports to displace it.

6 Objective liability of the Judicial Secretary for the acts of their subordinates: Following the doctrine of Avalos Blacha and González, the Judicial Secretary is objectively liable for the acts that are performed in their office, even if they are performed by employees under their charge. This objective liability (Arts. 1764, 1765, and 1766 of the CCyC Nación) is founded on the lack of service, and does not require intent or fault of the official. Therefore, if a judicial employee drafts a report using the Judicial Secretary's seal without authorization (Practical Case N° 3), the Judicial Secretary is objectively liable for that act, although they have not directly participated in its drafting. This objective liability reinforces the idea that the Judicial Secretary must rigorously control the acts that are performed in their office, and that the "improper delegation" of tasks does not exempt them from their liability.

7 Real possibilities of improper delegation and overlap of functions: Following the definitions of Mario Bunge, it must be distinguished between conceptual (or logical) possibility and real (or physical) possibility. A construction is conceptually possible if it does not introduce internal logical contradictions; it is conceptually impossible, for example, that a circle is square, or that an act is simultaneously valid and invalid in the same normative system. A fact is really possible if it is consistent with the relevant (natural or social) laws. Applying this distinction to Practical Case N° 3: the conduct of the employee who subscribes a report usurping the Judicial Secretary's seal is conceptually possible both in the procedural plane and in the criminal plane, because it does not introduce an insurmountable logical contradiction, but a violation of the legal order. In the procedural plane, the act is invalid (null for lack of competence of the official, Art. 149 CPCCBA, Law 15,240), but not conceptually impossible: invalidity is precisely the legal consequence foreseen by the system for an act that, in fact, can occur. In the criminal plane, the conduct is typically subsumable in the crimes of material falsehood (Art. 292 CP) or ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP), according to the case, which confirms its full conceptual possibility within the normative system. In both planes, it is a real possibility: it can occur and in fact occurs in practice, especially in courts with excessive procedural load. As Bunge points out, "the transition from possibility to actuality involves the activation of some latent or dormant mechanism"; in the judicial context, the excessive procedural load, the lack of effective control, and the delegation of own tasks in unauthorized personnel are the mechanisms that activate these real possibilities. The affected party could hardly demonstrate what occurred, because they do not have access to the internal functioning of the court to verify who really drafted and signed the document. Only in cases of evident material falsehood (apocryphal signature detectable through calligraphic expertise) could the irregularity be discovered. This informational asymmetry reinforces the liability of the State (Judicial Power) to ensure that these assumptions do not become realities (actualities), in compliance with Arts. 1764, 1765, and 1766 of the CCyC Nación (liability of the State for lack of service). As Avalos Blacha and González point out, the clear delimitation of own and administrative functions, and the assignment of the latter to specific administrative personnel, is the way to prevent that these real possibilities materialize, guaranteeing the correct application of public faith and the objective liability of the Judicial Secretary.

5. Conclusion and Perspectives

The update to the Civil and Commercial Code of the Nation and to the Civil and Commercial Procedural Code of the Province of Buenos Aires (Law 15,240) has not modified the dogmatic essence of public faith, but demands a supreme technical rigor in its procedural application. The doctrine of Zinny, Rivas, Liberatore, and Provenzani Casares demonstrates that the public faith of the notifying officer (Art. 290 CCyC Nación) is not an absolute fiction, but a presumption iuris tantum that can only be destroyed through the suitable procedural paths: the incident of nullity for the formal vices of the procedural act, the rebuttal of fraud for the direct attacks to the veracity of the official, and the motion for reconsideration against providences of mere procedure based on reports from the judicial secretary lacking public faith of perception.

Judges cannot destroy public faith based on reports from the judicial secretary or statements of parties without offering "backing arguments" that materially justify the destruction of the legal proof. Doing so implies violating due process, inverting the burden of proof, and dictating arbitrary sentences lacking reasoning. The legal certainty that public faith provides demands, as a counterpart, that its impeachment be subjected to the strict rules of the contradictory and the probatory burden.

Objective legal truth, as a guiding principle of the process, prevents the "conscious renunciation" to the knowledge of relevant and evident procedural data. The lawyer who denounced the irregularities in the analyzed case complied with their professional duty to collaborate with the adequate service of justice. As Luis A. Rodríguez Saiach points out, the lawyer is a collaborator of the judge and is at the service of justice (Art. 59, inc. 1, Law 5177), and the rulings that conceal objective legal truth due to manifest ritual excess violate Art. 18 CN. The paradox of sanctioning the complainant instead of investigating the officials involved in the original irregularities constitutes a systemic incoherence that erodes trust in the disciplinary control mechanisms.

• Projection 1: The dogmatic distinction between "public faith of perception" (notifier) and "public faith of relation/collation" (judicial secretary) must be incorporated in the training of judicial operators to avoid the tacit validation of administrative judgments that contradict public instruments.
• Projection 2: The principle of re-channeling of impugnative paths (the judge must ex officio re-channel a rebuttal erroneously raised against a report from the judicial secretary towards the motion for reconsideration or the incident of nullity) must be consolidated as a uniform jurisprudential criterion in the Province of Buenos Aires, in application of the ordering and instructing powers of Arts. 34 and 36 CPCCBA.
• Projection 3: The dogmatic impossibility that a report from the judicial secretary "acquires firmness" to destroy notarial public faith must be invoked as an argument of arbitrariness before the Supreme Court of Justice of the Province of Buenos Aires in the cases where the judges of first instance validate such reports without adequate reasoning.
• Projection 4: The distinction between material falsehood (Art. 292 CP) and ideological falsehood (Art. 293 CP) must be incorporated in the training of judicial operators, to avoid the erroneous qualification of the conducts of public officials and ensure the correct application of impugnative paths.
• Projection 5: The functions of the Judicial Secretary as a public official with public faith of perception (in hearings, lotteries, auctions) must be incorporated in the training of judicial operators, to ensure the correct application of the rebuttal of fraud when the veracity of the facts perceived personally by the Judicial Secretary is questioned.
• Projection 6: The delimitation between own (judicial) and administrative functions of the Judicial Secretary, proposed by Avalos Blacha and González, must be incorporated in the training of judicial operators, to ensure that the functions that generate public faith (own functions) are performed exclusively by the Judicial Secretary, and that the administrative functions are delegated to administrative personnel with the due liability. This would avoid the "improper delegation" of tasks and would ensure the correct application of public faith.
• Projection 7: The objective liability of the Judicial Secretary for the acts of their subordinates (Arts. 1764, 1765, and 1766 of the CCyC Nación) must be incorporated in the training of judicial operators, to ensure that the Judicial Secretary rigorously controls the acts that are performed in their office, and that the "improper delegation" of tasks does not exempt them from their liability.

📚 Bibliography and Links of Interest

Current Regulations

• Civil and Commercial Code of the Nation (Law 26,994, Decree 79/2014) — Arts. 1764, 1765, and 1766 (Liability of the State), 289, 290, 291, 296, 332, 1031, 1641.
• Civil and Commercial Procedural Code of the Province of Buenos Aires (Law 15,240) — Arts. 34, 36, 38 (Functions of the Judicial Secretary), 45, 120, 125 inc. 5 (Acts of hearings), 149, 172, 178, 238 and 241 (reconsideration), 248 (subsidiary appeal), 272, 375, 393, 400 and ss. (Certification of proofs).
• Penal Code of the Nation — Arts. 292 (material falsehood), 293 (ideological falsehood).
• Constitution of the Province of Buenos Aires — Arts. 17, 168.
• Law 5827 (Organic Law of the Judicial Power of the Province of Buenos Aires) — Functions of the Judicial Secretary.
• Ruling 3397/08 of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Province of Buenos Aires.
• Resolution 3209/13 (Augusta System) — Liability of the Judicial Secretary over data loading.
• Law 11,723 of Intellectual Property — Arts. 10 and 11 (Right to quote and transformative works).

Doctrine (Base articles analyzed and updated)

• Zinny, Mario Antonio. "Falsedad ideológica" (Ideological falsehood). Revista La Ley, Tomo 2006-C, p. 1032. Buenos Aires: La Ley S.A. (Work cited and analyzed in accordance with the right to quote of Art. 10, Law 11,723).
• Rivas, Adolfo A. "De las notificaciones y la redargución de falsedad" (On notifications and the rebuttal of fraud) (Commentary on the ruling "Caneva c. Rama"). Revista La Ley, Tomo 1993-A, p. 518. Buenos Aires: La Ley S.A. (Work cited and analyzed in accordance with the right to quote of Art. 10, Law 11,723).
• Liberatore, Gloria Lucrecia. "Nulidad de notificaciones y redargución de falsedad. Intervención del oficial público" (Nullity of notifications and rebuttal of fraud. Intervention of the public official) (Commentary on the ruling "Peugeot Citröen c. Jáuregui"). Suplemento Doctrina Judicial Procesal, La Ley, 01/09/2009, p. 74. Buenos Aires: La Ley S.A. (Work cited and analyzed in accordance with the right to quote of Art. 10, Law 11,723).
• Provenzani Casares, Ariel E. "El 'silogismo judicial' y los 'argumentos de respaldo'" (The 'judicial syllogism' and the 'backing arguments') (Commentary on the ruling "Ruarte c. Lano"). Abeledo Perrot / APBA, 20/01/2014. Buenos Aires: Abeledo Perrot. (Work cited and analyzed in accordance with the right to quote of Art. 10, Law 11,723).

Complementary Doctrine

• Calamandrei, Piero. Estudios sobre el proceso civil (Studies on the civil process). Translation by Santiago Sentís Melendo. Buenos Aires: Bibliográfica Argentina, 1961.
• Dworkin, Ronald. Los derechos en serio (Taking rights seriously). Barcelona: Ariel Derecho, 2012.
• Vigo, Rodolfo. "Consideraciones iusfilosóficas sobre el abuso del derecho" (Iusphilosophical considerations on the abuse of right). Revista de Derecho Privado y Comunitario, N° 16. Rubinzal-Culzoni.
• Carnelutti, Francesco. La Prueba Civil (Civil proof). Translation by Niceto Alcalá-Zamora y Castillo. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Arrayú, 1955.
• Bertolino, Pedro. La verdad jurídica objetiva (Objective Legal Truth). 2nd ed. Buenos Aires: LexisNexis, 2007. (Commented by Nicolás Guzmán in JA 2008-I-1418). (Work cited and analyzed in accordance with the right to quote of Art. 10, Law 11,723).
• Bunge, Mario. Philosophical Dictionary. Prometheus Books, 2003. (Definitions of conceptual possibility and real possibility). (Work cited and analyzed in accordance with the right to quote of Art. 10, Law 11,723).
• Camps, Carlos Enrique. Código Procesal Civil y Comercial de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (Anotado - Comentado - Concordado) (commentary on Art. 36). (Work cited and analyzed in accordance with the right to quote of Art. 10, Law 11,723).
• Rodríguez Saiach, Luis A. Derecho Procesal Teórico Práctico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (chapter on Law 5177 on the Practice of Law). (Work cited and analyzed in accordance with the right to quote of Art. 10, Law 11,723).
• Avalos Blacha, María Verónica and González, Evangelina Mafalda. "Delimitación de funciones propias y responsabilidad del Secretario y Auxiliar Letrado" (Delimitation of own functions and liability of the Judicial Secretary and Legal Assistant). Paper presented at the Judicial Secretariat Congress (FAM - Federación Argentina de Magistrados), Judicial Department of Quilmes. (Work cited and analyzed in accordance with the right to quote of Art. 10, Law 11,723).

Links of Interest

• Related articles from Proyecto WWW (English version):
• "Public Faith, No Contradiction, and the Administration of Justice. 2026 Update"
• "Essay on the Logic of the Case. 2026 Update"
• "Distinction between conceptual possibility, real possibility, and reality. 2026 Update" (Spanish version - no English translation available)
• Infoleg - National Legislative Information
• Normas GBA - Provincial Legislation Buenos Aires
• Supreme Court of Justice of the Province of Buenos Aires
• Proyecto WWW (English Version)
• Proyecto WWW (Spanish Version)